Anyone trying to wrap their heads around concepts like "elite overproduction," credentialism, the decline of competence, and distrust in institutions needs to read this essay.
Reading classic Chinese historical novels like Three Kingdoms and Outlaws of the Marsh, a recurrent trope is that of the man who fails the imperial exam and becomes a bandit or warlord. There were many who wanted to be a part of the state but were locked out of the system by their own inability to pass the test, or those like Zhang Jue (who led the Yellow Turban Rebellion) who passed at the county level but who was denied further promotion. To the extent that this was a historical phenomenom and not just a literary conceit (e.g. Huang Chao and Hong Xiuquan both failed the test hundreds of years apart and led rebellions), it might be an argument against the idea that the examination system produced stability.
Very interesting! I wonder if this could be further buttressed by geographic analysis - were exams more likely to be a higher or lower proportion of civil servant entrants closer to the periphery of empire vs the heartlands, or on troublesome border areas vs peaceful ones?
Fantastic bit of research. It shines an interesting light onto the mechanism that allows for powerful and consistent control to be exerted on such a geographically diverse and numerically massive populace.
From what I remember too one element of the Qing’s destabilisation in the 1800s had to do with a shortage of administrative postings to accommodate the rising number of Han exam graduates - and the consequent resentment of Manchu privilege in that area. Seems almost paradoxical that the exams were scrapped in the name of good government at the same time (1900s) as European bureaucracies were embracing them, but basically consistent with their role in reproducing an ideology which elites had completely lost confidence in.
Anyone trying to wrap their heads around concepts like "elite overproduction," credentialism, the decline of competence, and distrust in institutions needs to read this essay.
Good article here.
Reading classic Chinese historical novels like Three Kingdoms and Outlaws of the Marsh, a recurrent trope is that of the man who fails the imperial exam and becomes a bandit or warlord. There were many who wanted to be a part of the state but were locked out of the system by their own inability to pass the test, or those like Zhang Jue (who led the Yellow Turban Rebellion) who passed at the county level but who was denied further promotion. To the extent that this was a historical phenomenom and not just a literary conceit (e.g. Huang Chao and Hong Xiuquan both failed the test hundreds of years apart and led rebellions), it might be an argument against the idea that the examination system produced stability.
Very interesting! I wonder if this could be further buttressed by geographic analysis - were exams more likely to be a higher or lower proportion of civil servant entrants closer to the periphery of empire vs the heartlands, or on troublesome border areas vs peaceful ones?
50% of selection was through meritocratic exams
In say Britain during the same period, what percentage of elite selection was done through something similar?
Very insightful essay. Thank you for this.
Fantastic bit of research. It shines an interesting light onto the mechanism that allows for powerful and consistent control to be exerted on such a geographically diverse and numerically massive populace.
Fascinating and insightful.
From what I remember too one element of the Qing’s destabilisation in the 1800s had to do with a shortage of administrative postings to accommodate the rising number of Han exam graduates - and the consequent resentment of Manchu privilege in that area. Seems almost paradoxical that the exams were scrapped in the name of good government at the same time (1900s) as European bureaucracies were embracing them, but basically consistent with their role in reproducing an ideology which elites had completely lost confidence in.